

Grenada and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean Region in the 21st Century: A Retrospective Appraisal of the 1983 Invasion

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Abstract: *This paper examines the changing dynamics of United States' relations with states in the Caribbean region since the early 1980s, using as case study the invasion of Grenada in 1983 which ended that country's political experiment. It adopts a historical approach based on a critical review of the literature to explore U.S.' use of its military, political, and economic powers to advance its political and foreign policy goals in the region. Many analysts considered the Reagan Administration's official reason for the invasion as merely a smokescreen for expansion of U.S. influence in the region during its Cold War rivalry with the former Soviet Union. It was an ominous reminder of how powerful nations exploit the vulnerabilities of weaker nations to advance their national interests. The invasion rolled back some of social and economic development gains achieved during Maurice Bishop's brief regime. The U.S. abandoned its obligations to Grenada following the invasion. The invasion complicated U.S.-Caribbean relations in terms of U.S.'s benign neglect of the region while at the same time leveraging its clout to advance its political, strategic/security and economic interests. The lesson is that small nations should strengthen internal democracy and forge regional political and economic ties in order to preserve their sovereignty.*

Keywords: U.S.-Caribbean relations; Grenada invasion; Grenada Revolution; U.S. foreign policy; Cold War rivalry; hegemonic domination; globalization; history; politics; power

Introduction

This is an assessment of the changing dynamics of United States' (hereinafter rendered as U.S.) political and strategic relations with nations of the Caribbean region following the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. The Grenada invasion represented a watershed moment in U.S. foreign policy toward the region. It signaled a shift from an unwritten policy of passive engagement to a more proactive stance in its relations with the region in the period preceding the invasion and shortly afterwards.



Using a historical approach embedded in a critical review of the literature, we explore the political, security and foreign policy implications of the invasion including, on one hand, its effects on internal politics and economic development in Grenada. On the other hand, we examine the extent to which the invasion, alongside other circumstances before the 1980s, have shaped the tenor of U.S. foreign policy toward nations in the Caribbean region. We argue that the invasion neither advanced America's foreign policy and national security interests nor helped to improve America's relations with Grenada and other nations in the Caribbean region.

U.S. foreign policy and military interactions with Caribbean nations have oscillated between two scenarios through much of the 20th century and the early decades of the present 21st century. It featured a period of active involvement in the affairs of the region in furtherance of U.S. political, military and economic interests, followed by a period of benign neglect in which the US became aloof to the point of inattentiveness. However, the period of active U.S. engagement with the region is longer than the period of its passive relationship.

Overall, the U.S. has long been interested in the political stability of the region and regards the region as a potential market for American goods and services. This paper presents a panoramic picture of the changing dynamics in US-Caribbean relations with a focus on how U.S. policy has shaped the history, politics, social and economic development of the Caribbean region. It also examines how U.S. involvement is perceived in the region.

This review is an important and timely addition to the existing literature on US-Caribbean relations. The Caribbean region remains a major focus of U.S. development assistance. In addition, while Caribbean states seek close bilateral and multilateral ties with the U.S., their citizens and those in the diaspora in the U.S. maintain strong historical, people-to-people links which makes the topic of US-Caribbean relations a subject of intense interest. Besides, the enormous clout of the U.S. not only as a global power but also as the regional power in the Western Hemisphere means that U.S. actions and policy stances have far reaching political, strategic and economic implications for nations and people in the region. This is undoubtedly significant and deserves attention and scrutiny.

The paper provides a historical background of the U.S. relations and engagement with the Caribbean region dating from the late 18th century. This is followed by an overview of the events leading up to the Grenada and its aftermath. We then place in perspective the underlying geo-political and ideological motivations for U.S. political and foreign policy actions in the Caribbean region – the quest for hegemonic domination. We examine the impact of the invasion on Grenada politics and aspects of economic development. Finally, we identify lessons from the invasion and offer policy recommendations.

Background of U.S. intervention in the Caribbean region

The U.S. military forays into the Caribbean region dates back to late eighteenth century when



it emerged as a sovereign nation-state after winning independence from Britain. By the turn of the nineteenth century, the U.S. had become an industrial and political powerhouse that sought to influence the course of events in a manner that would advance its political, economic, military-strategic, and cultural interests. A number of factors, ranging from geography to military prowess, facilitated America's pursuit of its imperialist designs in the region.

In terms of geographic proximity, it was argued that the geo-strategic and political situation of Grenada necessitated the U.S. invasion and brief occupation (Clap and Wilkinson, 2010; Pfaff, 2001). In addition, the Reagan Administration assumed that Grenada, under the Maurice Bishop regime, was increasingly becoming an outpost for Soviet and Cuban communist designs in the region (Lacey, 2018). America was determined to prevent the Cubans and Soviets from creating a satellite state so close to the vital shipping lanes of the U.S. and its global partners.

In the Western Hemisphere as well as other parts of the world large states with strong economies and military power tend to exercise clout and project their power on small states within their geographic region. Large regional powers in different parts of the world often operate from certain vantage points: the advantages of military might, economic endowments, and political clout, which allow them to expand their influence within the region (Ikenberry, 2004). They are able to interfere in the domestic affairs of small, less powerful states. During the Cold War era, small-island Caribbean states lived under constant threat of invasion by the United States could occur if they adopted measures that the U.S. considered inimical to its strategic and economic interests. Grenada's invasion exemplified that fear.

From very early on, during the 1800s and 1900s, the United States became involved in the region, which it considered its backyard, in response to rivalries among different European powers that were meddling with the affairs of Caribbean states. The rivalries among Spanish, French, British, and Dutch colonizing powers threatened America's trade and investment interests. The U.S. intervened to secure for itself unfettered "access to and control over commercial and military transportation arteries" in the region (Randall and Mount, 1998, 25).

However, with the passage of time, the intensity of U.S. involvement in the region diminished. In the present post-Cold War era, the US is more interested in economic relations and political developments in the bigger Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (Scott, 2001) than with the smaller Caribbean island nations. But even then, the U.S. seems to pay attention to the larger countries only when there is a threat to the status quo, such as a threat of revolution, especially since the socialist revolution in Cuba in 1959. In the case of Mexico, for example, U.S. policy has largely focused on stemming the flow of illegal immigration and illicit drugs (Latin American News Digest, 2015).

The ideological underpinning of America's involvement was the vision of a peaceful,



politically stable, and an economically viable Western Hemisphere, based on the assumption that a stable environment would facilitate expansion of trade and investment and promote its access to the region's natural resources. (Randall and Mount, 1998). That vision was expressed in different doctrines and policies, including Manifest Destiny, No-Transfer, and the Monroe Doctrine. Realizing this vision entailed maintenance of law and order in the region through the use of economic, military and political levers. This enabled the U.S. to carve out a sphere of influence in the Caribbean region.

Manifest Destiny connotes the commitment of the United States to expand its territorial reach into any part of the region in which it felt it had a legitimate interest. For example, in the 1850s, some proponents of Manifest Destiny argued that Cuba was a legitimate possession of the U.S., while others pushed for even greater expansion of U.S. presence southwards. (Randall and Mount, 1998). *No-Transfer* sought to secure America's geopolitical interests in the region. Enacted through a Congressional Resolution in 1811, the policy called attention to "the 'peculiar' situation of Spain and her American provinces and warned that it [Congress] could not ... see any of these territories pass into the hands of any foreign power" (Maingot, 1994, 14). The policy motivated the U.S. to hold onto states in the region which it believed it had legitimate territorial interest, including warding off any foreign aggressor.

The *Monroe Doctrine*, articulated by President James Monroe in 1823, further reinforced American intent to control territory and events in the region by preventing European intervention and re-colonization. President Monroe declared that "the American continents, by free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power" (Maingot, 1994, 15). He warned that any further European intervention in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as an unfriendly action toward the U.S. that would be met with force.

Therefore, from the early nineteenth century the U.S. has remained a force to be reckoned with in the region. The underlying ideological notions of "Manifest Destiny, mission, a sense of uniqueness of the American experience, the desire to spread the values of capitalism and democracy" (Randall and Mount, 1998, 33), have shaped U.S. foreign policy and military operations in the region. The desire to spread the values of capitalism and democracy meant encouraging U.S. business investments in the region as well as support of democratic governments which, during the Cold War era, meant foreclosing any threat of communist penetration.

However, the assumption of American support of democratic regimes in the region was not realized because, time and again, that support tended to produce autocratic regimes. One U.S. administration after another looked the other way while governments in the region deemed safe, because they did not have the capacity of becoming "another Cuba," or were U.S. allies, (Raines, 2010), violated the human rights of their own citizens or perpetrated massive corruption with impunity. In contrast, Grenada was invaded on the grounds of the need to prevent another Cuba from taking root in the region.



Overview of the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada

Grenada is the smallest and most southerly of the Windward Islands of the eastern Caribbean. The country consists of the large main island of Grenada, some 311 square kilometers in area, and several smaller island dependencies with a combined area of 33 square kilometers. At the time of the U.S. invasion in 1983 the population of the country was a mere 90,000 people, which made the country a micro-state, in the sense the term is used in the international relations literature (Ingebritsen et al, 2006). The original inhabitants of the island, the Carib Indians, were wiped out during the early stages of European colonialization, and replaced by people of African descent who were brought into the island as slaves (Meditz and Hanratty, 1989; Steele, 2003; Thorndike, 1985).

Grenada received independence from Britain in 1974 under a government headed by Prime Minister Eric Gairy. Gairy's regime was overthrown on March 13, 1979 in a bloodless coup led by a young British-trained lawyer, Maurice Bishop. Bishop founded and led the New Joint Effort for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (JEWEL) Movement. The Movement was organized as a political party which ran the People's Revolutionary Government under Bishop as Prime Minister. Within the four short years that the Bishop regime lasted, 1979-1983, Grenada recorded remarkable social and economic progress and made dramatic gains in healthcare, education, nutrition, employment, and infrastructure. (Zunes, 2013).

For example, the country achieved a nine-percent cumulative growth rate, and unemployment dropped from 49 percent during the Gairy regime (1974-1979) to 14 percent during the Bishop regime. (Zunes, 2013). Some of the most impressive areas of improvement included education (where the literacy rate grew to about 98 percent), free secondary education system (when the number of secondary schools tripled and scores of Grenadians were awarded scholarships for studies abroad), and free health care. Similarly, economic development and infrastructure received major boosts because the regime established ambitious programs that enhanced the fishing industry, handicrafts, housing, tourism, as well as the expansion of roads and transport systems and the upgrading of public utilities. (Zunes, 2013).

But the apparent political and economic achievements of the Bishop regime was not without internal misgivings and dissension within the ranks of the Movement. The Movement included a minority of hardliners, such as Bernard Coard (the Deputy Prime Minister), and Hudson Austin (the Army chief who also served as the secretary of interior and defense). These officials were concerned about Bishop's popularity and predominant role in the government: Bishop was the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army and People's Revolutionary Militia as well as the Chairman of the Movement's Central Committee. As Chairman of the Central Committee he made all the important political and security decisions.

Bernard Coard and Hudson Austin led a military coup on October 19, 1983, and placed Bishop and his supporters under house arrest. This was followed by his execution and the fall of the regime. It was ironical that one of the reasons for the coup was the accusation of the



Coard-Austin faction of the Movement that Bishop was “insufficiently radical” (Zunes, 2013). This was in spite of Bishop’s radical rhetoric and his expressed desire to expand relations with Cuba. The faction also complained about the excessive concentration of political powers in Bishop’s hand.

The Reagan Administration invaded Grenada in the wake of the confusion and chaos that followed the coup. It is noteworthy that although Grenada was not an important U.S. trading partner, (and the U.S. had no compelling economic interest in the island), it was nevertheless considered geo-strategically important. The U.S. assumed a vested interest in upholding peace and order in Grenada. It felt the need to eliminate any trouble spots in the region, and foreclose the emergence of ‘another Cuba’ – a reference to Grenada. (Raines, 2010). It is instructive that the underlying motivation for the invasion was the enduring quest of the U.S. to exercise hegemony and secure its own version of stability and order in the Western Hemisphere. This is discussed in the following section which also features more details about the invasion.

The context of enduring hegemonic domination

The U.S. invasion of Grenada was a historical reminder of old international politics hued in hegemony—a political, economic condition of European and, by extension, American geopolitical behavior toward former colonies. Hegemonic dominance harks back to the history of domination of less powerful nations by more powerful ones. Although the U.S. was not a colonial power in the old-fashion sense, its invasion of Grenada gave it the look of a colonizer. The invasion was a reminder of the bitter experience of colonialism endured by most of the states in the Western Hemisphere. (Garreton and Newman, 2001; Meeks, 1986; Lewis, 1987; Searle, 1983; Thomas, 1984).

The reality of hegemonic domination is alive and well in the world of today. Examples of hegemonic domination include China and its control of a territory, Tibet, where the people do not regard themselves as a natural part of China. (Sperling, 2004). Another example is Russia which, under the pretense of a democratic referendum in 2014, annexed Crimea onto its already massive landmass. (Shuster, 2014). Yet a more lasting example is signified by the centuries of war between and among European powers over ownership of portions of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. (Campbell, 1975). Of course, the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 is another reminder of how powerful nations exploit the vulnerabilities of weaker political entities for political or economic gain—despite the “new world order” of international relations embodied in the United Nations in the aftermath of World War II (Mingst, et al, 2017).

The invasion of Grenada was undertaken to advance U.S. hegemony and prevent the rise of leftist governments in the Caribbean region. Kennedy (1987) asserts that the U.S. intervened primarily to stop “Cuba’s encouragement of leftist regimes in Nicaragua and Grenada”. (Kennedy, 1987, 397). President Reagan did not hide his hostility for the emerging Soviet and Cuban influence in Grenada. On March 23, 1983, during a televised address, the



president publicized the issue of Soviet and Cuban influence in Grenada. He saw the construction of an international airport at Port Salines in Grenada as “a means of extending Soviet and Cuban influence in the Caribbean Basin.” (Raines, 2010, 15).

Reagan displayed visual images that included a reconnaissance photograph of the airport construction at Point Salines to illustrate Soviet and Cuban penetration in the region. He wondered what that airport was intended for since “Grenada doesn’t even have an air force” (Raines, 2010, 27). For the Reagan Administration, the airport was an attempt by the Soviet Union and its Cuban proxies to establish a military foothold in the eastern Caribbean. The Administration also had misgivings about the sheer size and length of the runway (estimated at 9,000 feet), and thought that it would be used as a refueling and transit station for large Soviet military aircraft that would bring weapons into the region (Maingot, 1994).

The Administration also sought to stifle the Bishop regime by suggesting that American-owned St. George’s University, which was a main foreign exchange earner for Grenada, should relocate to another island in the Caribbean. The University leadership did not acquiesce to that request. The reasons given to the American people for the invasion, called Operation Urgent Fury, were that the coup had put American citizens (students at St. George’s University School of Medicine) in danger, and that the US had received an urgent request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to intervene (Zinn, 2005).

The explanation that the invasion was meant to prevent endangerment of American citizens was a flimsy effort by the Reagan Administration to justify the aggression. The fact on the ground was that American students were never really in any danger. Bernard Gwertzman of the *New York Times* reported that on seeing American ships heading toward Grenada, both Cuba and Grenada sent urgent messages to authorities that confirmed that American students were safe, and that military intervention was not necessary. However, the Administration “did not take the messages seriously, since it was determined to end the Cuban presence in Grenada and did not trust either the Cuban or Grenadian word”. (Gwertzman, 1983). Additionally, it was not valid that the invasion was in response to the request by eastern Caribbean leaders who were fearful about the turn of events in Grenada. Although, Prime Minister J.M.G. Adams of Barbados was vocal in expressing concern about the situation in Grenada and reportedly led the effort to persuade the other leaders on the need for American intervention, Trinidad and Tobago opposed the use of force along with a number of other Caribbean countries. (Gwertzman, 1983).

In retrospect, the manner of the request for invasion and U.S. acquiescence was not as straightforward as it appeared on the surface. The formal request that the U.S. and other friendly countries provide military help was made by the OECS at the request of the U.S.. The U.S. sought to prove that it had been requested to act under the terms of the Organization’s treaty. The wording of the formal request was drafted in Washington and conveyed to the Caribbean leaders by special American emissaries. (Gwertzman, 1983; Zinn, 2005). The events in Grenada occurred in a Cold War context of worldwide competition for



influence and supremacy between the U.S. and its allies and the then Soviet Union and its allies (Raines, 2010).

The events that led up to the invasion pre-dated the Reagan Administration. Before the 1979 Grenada Revolution, the U.S. had little interest in that country. It regarded the eastern Caribbean (within which is Grenada) a British sphere of influence. But the Revolution led the Carter Administration (which preceded the Reagan Administration) to revise America's policy of benign neglect. The Revolution was accompanied by rapid influx of Soviet and Cuban military advisers. In addition to Cuban advisers, Grenada accepted help from other communist states, including North Korea, the then East Germany, the then Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Vietnam, which contributed smaller amounts of arms, equipment, and training (Strasser et al., 1983).

That trend not only evoked suspicion but also infuriated the Carter Administration, which regarded Grenada as part of an "arc of crisis" – an emerging global sphere of expanding communist influence that Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, believed stretched from Afghanistan through the Horn of Africa to Central America. (Kaufman, 1993; Schoenhals, 1985). The U.S. relationship with Grenada became even more tense and tenuous during the Reagan years.

Grenada was leaning more toward the eastern bloc and was adopting policies that the U.S. considered inimical to its national security interests. The U.S. became increasingly concerned with "the left-leaning actions of Marxist-Leninist Grenada and its Cuban ally," which were "instrumental in giving shape to the new Caribbean geopolitical perspective". (Maingot, 1994, 150-151).

It did not help matters that the New Jewel Movement regime of Prime Minister Bishop permitted a large contingent of Cuban military advisers, doctors, engineers, construction workers, and so forth, which helped to "prop up the regime politically through military and security (including intelligence) assistance, and to shore it up economically [...] by providing jobs, health services and technical advice". (Maingot, 1994, 27). But what is wrong with a sovereign nation accepting aid from any friendly nation of its choice, and allowing citizens of that nation to enter its territory and contribute to its socioeconomic and military development?

Impact of the invasion on Grenada's political development

Before the invasion there was friction among Grenada's political leaders as alluded in a previous section. The underlying political conflicts and the climate of disunity among Grenada political elite only made things worse – the disunity and fractious politics made the country an easy prey for foreign intervention. Padilla and Houppert (1997) have argued that the friction within the New Jewel Movement leadership led to the assassination of Bishop (along with others in his fraction of the party) and the collapse of the government on October 19, 1983. The U.S. invasion on October 25, allegedly in concert with the



governments of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, occurred amid the vacuum and confusion that ensued (Padilla and Houppert, 1997).

Grenada did not become more democratic or better governed than it was before the invasion. The country continues to struggle with in-fighting among the political class and autocratic leadership, which breeds corruption, impunity, and poor governance. Following the invasion, Grenada has had a succession of autocratic leaders who, according to keen observer of events in the country, are “characteristically unbending, judgmental, do not take other people’s views into account, are threatened by other people’s ideas and skills and give more consideration to self over the interests of the society which they govern” (Douglas, 2013, 11).

Clearly, the U.S. invasion did little to address the deep-seated fissures in Grenada politics and society. It is not possible that a hastily executed military operation could lay the groundwork for establishment of structures and institutions necessary to advance democracy and good governance in a foreign country.

Lessons from the invasion and policy recommendations

The invasion left no one in doubt of the reality of international politics and the vulnerabilities of small, less powerful nations. Small island states with limited economic and military resources, such as Grenada, are subjected to the whims of bigger, more powerful states such as the United States. The Reagan Administration’s most urgent foreign policy objective was the removal of what it perceived as a communist threat on its doorstep (Randall and Mount, 1998; Davies, 1994).

Not only that, there was a certain arrogance in the manner that President Reagan went about the invasion of Grenada. When the president was told that worldwide opinion was opposed to the invasion, specifically that the United Nations General Assembly had voted by an overwhelming majority of 108 to 9 votes to condemn the U.S. action, he was reported to have dismissively stated that the vote “didn’t upset my breakfast at all” (Kinzer, 2013). Reagan’s comment suggested that the U.S. did not care about the sovereignty of Grenada. President Reagan did not feel that he owed the international community any explanation beyond some incidental remorse to Britain, U.S.’s close ally. (BBC, 2014).

The lesson from this experience is that small nations should strengthen internal democracy and political cohesiveness. The cohesiveness and unity among political leaders and citizens projects an image of strength to the outside world. In other words, when political leaders are united they can galvanize the citizenry with shared vision and a common aspiration to withstand foreign intervention. Caribbean political leaders should adopt confidence-building measures and form alliances that are capable of resisting external political manipulation.

At the individual country level, building political unity and institutionalizing democratic and accountable governments would serve as a bulwark against external aggressors. Caribbean citizens deserve to be governed by stable, responsive and accountable governments rather the



self-serving, fractious governments in the region which are often corrupt and alienated from the people. Stable and responsive governments would earn the respect and support of citizens and would be emboldened to confront external aggression.

As to whether or not the invasion advanced U.S.' security and international reputation, the U.S. did not become any more secure after the invasion than it was before the invasion. Its international reputation was not advanced. Instead, the invasion increased the perception of the U.S. as a bully among its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere (Bigelow, 2013). The lesson for policy makers is that more tact should be exercised before any intervention. Military intervention, if at all necessary, should be considered as a last resort. There should be extensive public input through hearings to engage different segments of American public opinion. This is necessary so that interventions, if and when ordered, would have broad-based popular support, and that policy makers and political leaders would be held accountable for those decisions.

It should be possible to certify that foreign military intervention would advance U.S. security interests. A policy blueprint that outlined the steps to be taken before foreign intervention is authorized was developed in response to the concerns expressed by segments of U.S. public opinion following the Grenada invasion. The policy, labeled the Weinberger Doctrine, was articulated by Reagan's Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger. It specified six tests or standards that policy makers should meet before the U.S. can undertake foreign military intervention. (Raines, 2010).

The first test was that vital U.S. national interests had to be at stake. Second, the U.S. had to be willing and able to commit sufficient military force to achieve its objectives. Third, the U.S. should not only have clearly defined political and military objectives but should also know "precisely" how to achieve those goals before proceeding on any foreign military intervention. Fourth, the president and secretary of defense had to "continually assess the size, composition, and disposition of U.S. forces" in the light of national objectives and changing conditions and make adjustments when needed. Fifth, the administration needed to do all that it can to secure support for the operation from Congress and the American people, and finally, policy makers needed to remember that the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should always be the last rather than the first resort in any crisis. (Raines, 2010, 520-521).

The intervention was planned and implemented hurriedly and there was no painstaking review of U.S. strategic interests and no consideration of outcomes for its image in the world. (Lacey, 2018). Instead, it fostered the impression around the world that the U.S. was acting as the world's policeman. The view of the U.S. government as global policeman is counterproductive to its effort to project a positive image in the world. The negative impression has not advanced America's image as a nation that represents a force for good. The U.S. can certainly do a better job of presenting its case for security, peace, order, and stability in the Caribbean region through dialogue and meaningful diplomacy rather than through raw and unwarranted display of superior military power.



Conclusion

This paper reviewed the changing patterns of U.S. foreign policy and political relations with the Caribbean region, from the late 20th century into the early decades of the 21st century, based on a retrospective case study of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. The invasion was a historical reminder of enduring geo-political domination of small-island states of the Caribbean region by the U.S. The underlying motivation was the quest to exercise hegemony and secure the U.S.' own version of stability and order in the region. This was in the context of its Cold war rivalry with the former Soviet Union when U.S. foreign policy focused on foreclosing any threat of communist penetration in a region it regarded as its backyard.

The invasion had negative consequences on Grenada's economic and political development. It did not advance U.S. international reputation. It raised multiple questions regarding U.S. commitment to international law and principles of non-interference and respect of the sovereign integrity of independent countries (regardless of size), human equality, and human rights. In this regard, it was suggested military intervention should never be contemplated because no nation, under international law, has a right to interfere in another nations' internal affairs and dictate what governing system they should adopt.

Intervention can be warranted for humanitarian reason and the U.S. should seek genuine regional and multilateral participation in any humanitarian intervention mission. The expectation that Grenada "would turn into a model of Caribbean prosperity, which would have meant that being conquered by Americans is a good thing" (Kinzer, 2013), was never realized. This was because after the invasion, American simply moved on.

On a cautionary note, while Grenada has put the U.S. invasion behind it, the country needs to strive and do more to change its trajectory. This trajectory can be enhanced if it is able to forge ties with other Caribbean states. Grenada cannot do much on its own due to such impediments as the lack of significant economies of scale given its small population size. Grenada needs to do its part to advance the goals of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). For example, it should join efforts to promote a single economic market in the region because as CARICOM makes strides there would be improvement in the fortunes of Grenada and its citizens. It is also important that Grenada transitions to a stable, responsive and accountable governance for the good and wellbeing of its citizens.

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